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1. "When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again" is a popular Civil War-era song that
expressed citizens' longing for the return of their family and friends from the war. Library of
Congress, Overview Page: When Johnny Comes Marching Home Again: Patriotic Melodies (Library
of Congress), http://lcweb2.1oc.gov/cocoon/ihas/loc.natlib.ihas.200000024/default.html (last visited
Oct. 18, 2007).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The 2001 commencement of the "War on Terror 2  placed an
unprecedented demand on the National Guard and Reserves.3 While Desert
Storm involved the deployment of 222,614 ready reservists, 4 over 590,000
Guard members and Reservists have been mobilized since September 11,
2001, 5  with nearly fifty percent of the active military comprised of
members of the National Guard and Reserve.6 This nation's reliance upon
the National Guard and Reserve for essential military readiness is reaching
unprecedented levels.7 From its original conception as an organized group
2. It appears President George W. Bush's first use of the phrase "War on Terror" to describe the
Administration's efforts to stamp out terrorism against the United States came in a September 29,
2001 Radio Address of the President to the Nation. George W, Bush, U.S. President, Radio Address
of the President of the Nation (Sept. 29, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/
20010929.html.
3. The Army, Navy, Marines, Air Force, and Coast Guard Reserves are always under the
President's control. Eric Umansky, Army Reserve vs. National Guard: What's the Difference
Anyway?, Slate, Jan. 7, 2005, http://www.slate.com/id/2112001; see also U.S. Const. art. 11, § 2, cl.
1. This is not so with the Air and Army National Guards. Guard units are assigned to, and primarily
controlled by, individual states. Umansky, supra. This actually gives the Guard units greater
authority to enforce civilian laws, as the other branches of the military are prohibited by the Posse
Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2000), from doing so. Id. Guard units may be federalized and
come under Presidential authority should the President declare a national emergency as he did with a
partial mobilization following 9/I1. Umansky, supra; see also U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Guard
units are comprised of part-timers who normally train one weekend per month and an additional two
weeks per year and may be called up for two-year stints of duty. Umansky, supra. Reserve soldiers
who are on inactive duty may also be called up for active duty for the same period of time, and both
the Guard and the Reserves may, if Congress declares a national emergency, be compelled "to serve
for the length of the emergency plus six months." Id. (internal quotations removed). For an audio
description of the differences between the Reserves and the National Guard, see Andy Bowers, NPR:
Slate's Explainer: National Guard vs. Reserve (NPR audio broadcast Jan. 11, 2005), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=4278725.
4. Stephan A. Duncan, ROA National Security Report: Gulf War Was a Test of Reserve
Components and They Passed, in THE U.S. NAVAL WAR COLL., OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT, DESERT
SHIELD/DESERT STORM EMPLOYMENT OR RESERVE COMPONENT: EXTRACTS OF LESSONS LEARNED
29 (1991).
5. Marcel Quinn, Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
(USERRA) -Broad in Protections, Inadequate in Scope, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 237, 237 (2005)
(citing Bradley Graham, Reservists May Face Longer Tours of Duty, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2005, at
Al).
6. ESGR, EMPLOYER RESOURCE GUIDE: FOR BUSINESS LEADERS (2003), available at
http://www.esgr.org/contents/download/ESGR HRGuideFinal.pdf, see also Press Release, U.S.
Dept. of Defense, National Guard and Reserve Mobilized as of May 11, 2005 (May 11,
2005), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2005/nr20050511-3044.html ("Total
number currently on active duty in support of the partial mobilization for the Army National Guard
and Army Reserve is 149,581; Naval Reserve, 3,653; Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve,
9,361; Marine Corps Reserve, 11,299; and the Coast Guard Reserve, 581. This brings the total
National Guard and Reserve personnel, who have been mobilized, to 174,475, including both units
and individual augmentees.").
7. ESGR, FAQ for Employers, http://esgr.org/resources.asp?p=employersfaq (last visited Oct.
8, 2007).
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of local militias,8 the National Guard has evolved into an integral player in
military personnel strategy. 9
The significant increase in deployment, both in numbers and in length,
has taken a toll on both the reservist and the employer.' 0 The War on Terror
has required many of those deployed to leave family, friends, and
employment for over a year. One news article reported:
[The] resulting burden has been as much financial as emotional for
many families, as onetime weekend warriors see their incomes
shrink and businesses dry up.
... [W]hen employers pick up the financial slack, the burden has
been relatively minor. But many other families feel squeezed and
some feel pushed to the economic breaking point ....
... The self-employed have been hit especially hard, often having
no one to run their businesses for months at a time. ii
In a continued effort to insulate reservist employees from loss of
employment and to entice citizens who were concerned that enlisting in a
part-time military organization would jeopardize their full-time employment,
the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
12
8. The National Guard is the oldest division of the United States armed forces, established in
1637. Army National Guard, History of the Guard, available at http://www.amg.army.mil/
guardhistory.aspx (last visited October 18, 2007).
9. Employer Support of the Guard and Reserve (ESGR), a Department of Defense organization
founded to safeguard and develop the relationship between employers and their Guard and Reserve
employees, states, "The current National Defense Strategy indicates that the National Guard and
Reserve, will be full partners in the fully integrated Total Force. Our Reserve forces will
spend more time away from the workplace defending the nation, supporting a demanding
operations tempo and training to maintain their mission readiness." ESGR, About ESGR,
http://www.esgr.org/about.asp (last visited Oct. 18, 2007).
10. Sumana Chatterjee, Business Urges Limits on Military Service of Workers, Employees Active
in National Guard and Reserve Units Cause Headaches for Businesses, Employers Told Lawmakers,
PHILA. INQUIRER, June 26, 2004, at A02. ("Increased reliance in Iraq on the part-time warriors of
the National Guard and military reserves is straining U.S. businesses and could cause big problems
over time, business leaders and military experts told lawmakers yesterday. Employers must hold
jobs open for those called up for duty, but the short notice, long deployments and unpredictability
are stressing small and mid-sized companies, said Jeffrey Crowe, who sits on the board of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce.").
11. Steven Greenhouse, After the War: The Reservists; Balancing Their Duty to Family and
Nation, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2003, at N14.
12. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), Pub. L. No.
103-353, § 2(a), 108 Stat. 3150 (1994) (codified at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-33 (2000)), amended by
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(USERRA) was enacted in 1994.13 It requires an employer to permit
military absences by reservist employees and to reemploy the reservists
upon their return.14  Although USERRA guarantees employment, many
reservists continue to fear the loss of their jobs upon their deployment.15
The combination of this fear, along with the drastic decrease in wages upon
deployment, causes many reservists to look for new employment upon their
return home. 16
Employers also face significant burdens, especially small businesses.
Bobby Hollingsworth 17 stated that although the Pentagon does not track
economic effect on businesses:
It recognizes that using reservists "inextricably links the defense of
this nation to employers" ..... Some Army reservists are expected
to spend 12 months with "boots on the ground," plus varying time
for pre-deployment training. That means businesses lose their
employees for up to 18 months at a time, Crowe said. Some
reservists are called up for duty repeatedly, making it hard for some
employers to plan budgets and strategies.'1
Temporarily replacing low- to mid-level employees may be cumbersome. 19
Companies can draw upon temporary agencies and the unemployed with
minimal training and upstart time.20  However, war no longer is limited to
the traditional "guns-and-ground troop affair" but relies on sophisticated
"high-tech mastery and intelligence-gathering," resulting in a change in the
reservist deployment characterization.2 1 The twenty-first-century fighters
Veterans Program Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, § 212(b)(2), 112 Stat. 3331
(1998).
13. See infra Part II for the history of USERRA.
14. See USERRA § 2(a).
15. See Greenhouse, supra note 11.
16. Id. See also Robert A. Hamilton, While They're Protecting Us, Who's Protecting Them?,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, at 14CN ("I had health insurance, but it came out of my check, and if I
don't work I don't get paid, so I don't know what's going to happen with that," Mr. Walsh, a member
of the 143rd Military Police Company of the Connecticut National Guard and employee of New
England Building Products,] said. And while one of his supervisors has told him the company will
hold his job for him, he also knows that his co-workers will not be able to keep up if someone is not
brought in to replace him, "If they hire someone else, I'm not going to fight to get a job back where
someone doesn't want me," Mr. Walsh said. "I like my job, and the money is great, but I guess I'd
have to go someplace else.").
17. Hollingsworth is the director of the Pentagon's ESGR. Sumana Chatterjee, War Drains
Some Firms Jobs Held for Reservists and Guard in Iraq, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, June 25, 2004, at
Cl.
18. Id.
19. Jennifer Merritt, Sorry, the Boss Is in Baghdad, BUS. WK., Feb. 17, 2003, at 74.
20. Id.
,, .
250
[Vol. 35: 247, 2008] Welcome At Work?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
are "increasingly white-collar,' 22 with more skills and bigger duties, leaving
a bigger void when absent.23
With the armed forces increased dependency on "weekend warriors"
and the significant toll on employers, the resulting tension in the workplace
is inevitable, with more reservists facing hostility when notifying employers
of deployment orders or upon return from deployment.24 After reporting a
decrease in the number of USERRA complaints for several years in a row,
the Department of Labor is now reporting an increase in complaints since
2001 and the initiation of the "Global War on Terrorism.
' 25
While one of USERRA's purposes is to protect individuals who are
potentially sacrificing their lives in the interest of national security, it is not
apparent that this purpose is succeeding; while USERRA clearly prohibits
adverse discriminatory and retaliatory action based on military status, it is
unclear whether it precludes employers from exhibiting or allowing
employees to exhibit hostility toward their reservist workforce.26 Without a
clarification on this issue, the protections of USERRA may be undermined
as corporations look to create such a difficult work environment that
reservists are forced to either resign from the Reserves or their jobs.27
Although the hostile workplace provision is a well-established cause of
action under Title VII and has recently been applied under the ADA, the
question remains whether it is cognizable under USERRA.28 Because
USERRA includes anti-discriminatory language, courts may be susceptible
to automatically reliance upon Title VII's severe or pervasive test.29 Title
VII was enacted for the purpose of remedying past wrongs and removing
barriers experienced by historically disadvantaged groups, whereas
USERRA was intended to provide protections for the purpose of
22. Id. ("More than 60% of reservists surveyed in 2000 by the Defense Dept. say they work in
the corporate world, and a growing number come from the managerial ranks. While the Defense
Dept. doesn't collect specifics, reservist associations and human resource consultants say the number
of management types called up in the past year outpaces those activated in the Persian Gulf War by
an estimated 20%. And a higher percentage of the 111,600 reservists now on active duty are
officers, says John O'Shea of the reserve Officers Assn. Senior military rank typically translates into
a senior role in the civilian world.").
23. Id.
24. Hearing on the Fiscal 2006 Defense Budget Before S. Comm. on Armed Servs. Subcomm. On
Personnel, 110th Cong. (2005).
25. Id. (noting that complaints were decreasing from 1995 to 2001, but over the last three years
the duty days performed by reservists has tripled in relation to the complaints received).
26. The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C.
§ 4311 (2000).
27. See id.
28. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
29. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
encouraging military recruitment.3 ° This difference is likely to become even
more crucial in the current political environment.31
This article will address the underlying issues that are critical to any
legal analysis of hostile environment claims. Part II outlines the history of
USERRA and provides a basic framework for the protections it affords to
veterans. Part III traces the evolution of the hostile work environment claim
through its development under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Part IV
examines the unsettled landscape of hostile work environment claims
brought under USERRA and the various approaches taken by different
federal courts. Part V argues that these causes of action should be
unequivocally recognized by courts because the availability of these claims
is entirely consistent, not only with other anti-discrimination statutes, but
also with the explicit intent and underlying rationales of Congress. Finally,
Part VI concludes the discussion.
II. HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK OF VETERAN REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS AND
THE GENESIS OF USERRA
A. History of Veterans' Reemployment Rights
Reemployment protections first appeared in 1940 in anticipation of
America's entry into World War II and the corollary need for a large
prepared military. Congress enacted the Selective Training and Service Act
(STSA) to protect civilians who forsook employment for military training
prior to the United States' entry into the war.3 2 In the event war did not
ensue, Congress wanted the reentry into regular life for these civilians to be
as smooth as possible, including the ability to return to former
employment.33 Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah reflected this sentiment in
his statement before Congress:
30. Jennifer Merrigan Fay, Employment Law-Presumption Against Extraterritoriality Prevents
Application of 1964 Civil Rights Act Beyond United States Borders-EEOC v. Arabian American
Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991), 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 302, 302 n.3 (citing CIVIL RIGHTS IN
AMERICAN HISTORY xi (Kermit Hall ed. 1987)).
31. Robert Bums, Army Likely to Miss Year's Recruiting Goal; It Would Be the First Time Since
1999, PHILA. INQUIRER, June 9, 2005, at A17.
32. Pub. L. No. 783, § 8, 54 Stat. 885, 890-92 (1940) (codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 308 (1942)),
repealed by Pub. L. No. 759, § 17, 62 Stat. 625 (1948).
33. H. Craig Manson, The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of
1994, 47 A.F. L. REV. 55 (1999); Anthony H. Green, Note, Reemployment Rights Under the Uniform
Services Employment and Reemployment Act (USERRA): Who's Bearing the Cost?, 37 IND. L. REV.
213 (2003); Andy P. Fernandez, The Need for the Expansion of Military Reservists' Rights in
Furtherance of the Total Force Policy: A Comparison of the USERRA and ADA, 14 ST. THOMAS L.
REv RQ (9002).
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If it is constitutional to require a man to serve in the Armed Forces,
[sic] it is not unreasonable to require the employers of such men to
rehire them upon the completion of their service, since the lives and
property of the employers as well as everyone else in the United
States are defended by such service.3 4
Interest in protecting the ordinary lives of those called to serve in the
military continued for the next fifty years. In 1948, Congress reenacted the
protections of STSA within the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) so as
to support "conscription-based force management policies that existed for
the first twenty-five years of the Cold War. 3 5  Minor amendments were
made thereafter.36
In 1974, in light of the ensuing cessation of the Vietnam War, the repeal
of the draft, and the move in military strategy to a "peacetime" volunteer
force, MSSA was repealed and re-codified as the Vietnam Era Veterans'
Readjustment Assistance Act (VRRA).37 This amendment reflected the
change in military defense strategy known as the "Total Force Policy" that
was initiated in 1973.38 The military replaced a conscription-based force
with an increased reliance on volunteer soldiers, resulting in the Reserves
and National Guard becoming a more integral part of the military.39 This
trend continued through the end of the Cold War in the 1980s, as old
security threats were replaced with new threats located in different
geographical regions. 40 The 1991 Persian Gulf War was the first real test of
this new defense policy.
4
'
34. See Green, supra note 33, at 217-18 (quoting remarks of Sen. Thomas, 123 CONG. REC. 10,
573 (1940)).
35. See Manson, supra note 33, at 56-57 (asserting that the disfavor of the draft, where the
typical length of service for a draftee was two to three years, was postponed to some degree by these
reemployment protections).
36. Renamed the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 (MSSA) without major revisions to
reemployment protections. See Green, supra note 33, at 218. Its purpose once again was to "give
protection to reservists and National Guardsmen against discrimination after their reemployment
because of their military" duty. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Femandez, supra note 33, at 861.
39. Id. (stating that references to reservists incorporate members of all seven separate units of the
reserve and National Guard including the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Air
National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve).
40. See Green, supra note 33, at 219.
41. See Manson, supra note 33, at 58 (estimating that the number of reservists who actually
served during Desert Storm and Desert Shield vary from 200,000 to over 280,000); see also 139
CONG. REc. H2211 (daily ed. May 4, 1993) (statement of Rep. Clyburn indicating "more than
200,000 members of the National Guard and Reserve answered the call to duty").
B. USERRA 'S Goals
Although VRRA's protections were designed to assure retained
employment for reservists during military leave, both employers and
veterans were unsure of their obligations and rights under VRRA.42 The
veterans' reemployment statute had become complex and unruly with its
unclear distinctions among those who could qualify for its protections.43
Troubled with the complexities produced by the various amendments
made to VRRA over the years and problems faced by the returning Gulf War
veterans, Congress enacted the Uniformed Services Employment and Re-
Employment Rights Act in 1994. 44 The purpose of VRRA had been to
promote and encourage volunteerism in a large part-time military force
which could be activated in times of need-forces that could quickly be
trained and sent to war.45 Nevertheless, after serving in the Gulf War, many
reservists lost jobs, even with VRRA's protections.46 As a result, Congress
was concerned that such results would lead to fewer enrollees and create
distractions for those fighting.47 While the majority of the reservists were
well-treated by employers, Congress wanted USERRA to "undergird the
original language with a restatement of congressional intent that a person
may fulfill military commitments without fear of discrimination or
retaliation in their normal employment., 48 In addition, the provision would
no longer focus on whether or not the military member was on active duty,
but rather would provide blanket protection for all those serving in the
various military components.49
42. See 139 CONG. REC. H221 1 (statement of Rep. Brown).
43. Penni P. Bradshaw & Richard E. Fay, When Johnny comes Marching Home Again: the
Veteran 's Reemployment Rights Act and Employer Obligations to Military Reservists, 15 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 79, 81 (1991).
44. 38 U.S.C. § 4301 (2006); Pub L. 103-353, § 2(a), Oct. 13, 1994.
45. 38 U.S.C. § 4301.
46. See John F. Beasley Jr., Protecting America's Reservists: Application of State and Federal
Law to Reservists' Claims of Unfair Labor Practices, GA. B.J., Feb. 2002, at 12, available at
http://www.gabar.org/public/pdf/GBJ/feb02.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
47. See 139 CONG. REC. H2212 (statement of Congressman Clement) (commenting that without
this "protect[ion] from discrimination or reprisal on the job as a result of their service, it will be
increasingly difficult to recruit Americans to serve. This would seriously jeopardize the All-
Volunteer Force concept. Many of my fellow guard members served proudly in the gulf war. Upon
their return, some of these individuals experienced additional hardships and inconveniences in the
workplace as a direct result of their deployment overseas. These experiences have caused a great
deal of skepticism among the troops and a reluctance on the part of others to join the Guard and
Reserves."); see also 139 CONG. H2210 (statement of Rep. Hutchinson) ("This bill will help our
forces to concentrate totally on the purpose of their mission. If we are asking our service men and
women to risk their lives for our country, we must ensure that their employment rights are easily
understood and consistently observed.").
48. CONG. REC. H2210 (statement of Rep. Penny).
49. Id. (statement of Rep. Stump) ("It would effectively clarify and strengthen existing laws, on
veterans' reemployment rights. It would cover the active duty forces, reserves and National Guard
alike.").
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Congress reduced its original findings into three purposes:
(1) to encourage noncareer service in the uniformed services by
eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian careers and
employment which can result from such service;
(2) to minimize the disruption to the lives of persons performing
service in the uniformed services as well as to their employers, their
fellow employees, and their communities, by providing for the
prompt reemployment of such persons upon their completion of
such service; and
(3) to prohibit discrimination against persons because of their
service in the uniformed services.50
Substantial fines and punishments were to be assessed against those
companies refusing to abide by the dictates of the statute. 5' In summary, the
goal of USERRA was to encourage participation in the reserves, minimize
the disruption in the lives of those that served, foster anti-discriminatory
policies, and promote prompt reemployment upon return from military
leave. 52
C. The "Benefits of Employment" Provisions of USERRA
USERRA prohibits discriminatory actions by an employer against the
reservist employee, provides reemployment rights upon return from military
duty, and preserves benefits of employment for those on leave.53 This
article places particular emphasis on whether or not discrimination in
"benefits of employment" includes the right of the reemployed reservist to
be free from an intolerable or hostile work environment. This type of
environment can be caused by harassing supervisors or employees
disgruntled with a reservist's extended and recurring absences.
Additionally, USERRA prohibits an employer from denying "initial
employment, reemployment, retention in employment, promotion, or any
benefit of employment by an employer on the basis of that membership,
50. The Uniformed Services Employment and Re-Employment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C.
§ 4301 (2004).
51. § 4323.
52. §§ 4301,4311(a).
53. § 4301 et seq.
255
application for membership, performance of service, application for service,
or obligation. 54 The employer may neither retaliate nor take any adverse
employment action against a person for asserting rights under USERRA.
55
In order to prove discrimination under USERRA, a plaintiff must show the
plaintiffs military status was a motivating factor in the employer's negative
action.56 Once a plaintiff has shown a prima facie case of discrimination,
the employer may assert an affirmative defense if it "can prove that the
action would have been taken in the absence of such membership ....
As noted, USERRA incorporated many of VRRA's protections. Some
of these carryover provisions include: (1) returning reservists to the same, or
a comparable, position they were in before they were deployed, with the
same level of job seniority, status, and pay; (2) transferring disabled
employees to another position with similar seniority, status, and pay for
those employees disabled during their service if the employees can no longer
perform the duties of the previous position; (3) extending the opportunity for
the employees to continue health insurance through the employer without
any waiting or exclusion period for returning reservists and their family; and
(4) excusing the employer from reemploying the returning reservists if the
employer's circumstances are such that rehiring is impossible or
unreasonable.58 As to this last provision, mere inconvenience, loss of
efficiency, or economy of operation due to the extended leave is not deemed
to be unreasonable. 59
Previously the protections provided under VRRA depended upon
whether the reservist served in active duty voluntarily or involuntarily.
60
For instance, the length of time to which the reinstatement of employment
provisions could be extended depended upon whether the reservists
volunteered for Operation Desert Shield or Desert Storm or whether the
reservists were involuntarily called to active duty.61  Application
54. § 4311(a) (2000). USERRA also requires that any military member absent due to his
military service be reemployed, provided that notice is provided to the company within the
articulated deadlines. See, e.g., Ryan Wedlund, Citizen Soldiers Fighting Terrorism: Reservists'
Reemployment Rights, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 797 (2004).
55. § 4311 (b) ("An employer may not discriminate in employment against or take any adverse
employment action against any person because such person (1) has taken an action to enforce a
protection afforded any person under this chapter, (2) has testified or otherwise made a statement in
or in connection with any proceeding under this chapter, (3) has assisted or otherwise participated in
an investigation under this chapter, or (4) has exercised a right provided for in this chapter. The
prohibition in this subsection shall apply with respect to a person regardless of whether that person
has performed service in the uniformed services.").
56. § 4311 (c)(l).
57. Id.
58. See generally Bradshaw & Fay, supra note 43, at 84-86, 91.
59. Id. at 85.
60. Id. at 94.
61. Id. at 94-95 ("[T]he rules differ for reservists who may have volunteered for active duty and
those who ,were in,-ountarily called up. A reservist whn vo1unteered for active duty to support
256
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requirements for reemployment also varied based on whether the reservist
was mobilized under the Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up or 10 U.S.C.
§§ 672(d) and 673.62 "[M]ere inquiry into the possibility of reemployment"
did not qualify as application under the statute.63 The time during which the
employee was protected from termination or discharge for anything but
cause also depended upon which authority mobilized the reservist.
64
USERRA removed these distinctions.
Since Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., reemployment
statutes have been broadly interpreted in favor of the military employee.65
This broad statutory construction was preserved throughout the various
versions of veteran reemployment rights acts.66 USERRA's legislative
history elaborates that "[t]o deny such rights to employees who serve in the
military undermines the fundamental principle that the employee should not
be disadvantaged by military service.
67
In establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff has the
burden of proof to "show by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her
protected status was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse
employment action. ' 68 After the amendments of 1994, military status need
Operation Desert Shield or Desert Storm may extend an initial period of active duty of less than four
years up to the four year service limitation of subsection 2024(b)(1) and, upon discharge, still be
eligible for reinstatement of other employment benefits under the VRRA. However, reservists who
are called involuntarily to active duty may voluntarily extend their active duty only for a period
equal to the maximum allowed under the statutory call-up authority.").
62. Id. at 84 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 2024(c) (1988)).
63. Id. at 96.
64. Id. at 85, 99 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 2021(b)(1) (1988)).
65. 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946) (citing Boone v. Lightner, 319 U.S. 561, 575 (1943)). For
discussion of the "escalator principle" introduced in Fishgold, 328 U.S. at 284-85, refer to Wedlund,
supra note 54, at 817.
66. 140 CONG. REC. H9133 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1994) (statement of Rep. Montgomery)
("Incidents or advantages of employment . . . [are] intentionally framed in general terms to
encompass the potential[ly] limitless variation in benefits of employment that are conferred by an
untold number and variety of business concerns.").
67. 140 CONG. REC. 24423 (1994) (statement of Rep. Montgomery).
68. Gillie-Harp v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1119 (W.D. Wis. 2003). After
the 1994 changes made in USERRA, a plaintiff was no longer required to show that termination was
solely a result of plaintiff's military obligations, but rather that the "defendant was motivated in part
by an impermissible factor." Id. at 1118. Interestingly, the court looked to Title VII case law, where
the court found that the employer's reliance upon or taking of a "protected characteristic" into
account violates Title VII. Id. (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989),
superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, as recognized in Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780
F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. Cal. 1992)). The Federal Circuit, in an unpublished opinion,
Fahrenbacher v. Department of Veterans Affairs, adopted a variation of this test by requiring the
plaintiff, in establishing a prima facie case, to show: "'(1) [h]e was a member of a protected group;
(2) he was similarly situated to an individual who was not a member of his protected group; and (3)
he was treated more harshly or disparately than the individual who was not a member of his
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only be a "motivating factor" and not the sole cause of the action, meaning
that the military status was one of the factors that 'a truthful employer
would list if asked for the reasons for its decision. ,' 69 It is a motivating
factor if an employer relies, considers, or conditions a decision based on
reservist status.7 °
Direct or circumstantial evidence may be used to prove discriminatory
motive. 71 Factors that may be used to infer discriminatory motive include:
[P]roximity in time between the employee's military activity and
the adverse employment action, inconsistencies between the
proffered reason and other actions of the employer, an employer's
expressed hostility towards members protected by the statute
together with knowledge of the employee's military activity, and
disparate treatment of certain employees compared to other
employees with similar work records or offenses. 72
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of
persuasion then shifts to the employer to show the same decision would have
been made regardless of the plaintiff's protected status.73  Simply
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason is insufficient. Rather, an
employer must show its legitimate reasons that would have induced it to
make the same decision.74 The relevant question then becomes whether the
employer honestly believed the employee's behavior warranted the
termination.75  Remedial measures that can be asserted against
protected group."' 243 F.3d 567 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (quoting Duncan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 73 M.S.R.P.
86, 93-94 (1997), overruled by Fox v. U.S. Postal Serv., 88 M.S.R.P. 381 (2001)); see also Sheehan
v. Dep't of Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
69. Sanguinetti v. U.P.S., 114 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (quoting Brandsasse v.
City of Suffolk, 72 F. Supp. 2d 608, 617 (E.D. Va. 1999); see also Akhdary v. City of Chattanooga,
No. 1:01-CV-106, 2002 WL 32060140, at *8 (E.D. Tenn. May 22, 2002) (citing Robinson v. Morris
Moore Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 974 F. Supp. 571, 576 (E.D. Tex. 1997)).
70. Robinson, 974 F. Supp. at 576.
71. Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1014.
72. Akhdary, 2002 WL 32060140, at *9.
73. Gillie-Harp, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 1119. The courts adopted the two-part analysis set forth in
N.L.R.B. v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393 (1983), and have rejected the use of
the McDonnell Douglas three-part analysis usually applied in federal antidiscrimination cases.
McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973). McDonnell Douglas was deemed
inconsistent with the Transportation Management "because in McDonnell Douglas only the burden
of production shifts to the defendant while the burden of persuasion always remains with the
plaintiff." Gillie-Harp, 249 F. Supp. at 1119; see also Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1013-14.
74. Robinson, 974 F. Supp. at 576 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 252
(1989)).
75. Chance v. Dallas County Hosp. Dist., No. 3-96-CV-2842-BD, 1998 WL 177963, at *5 (N.D.
Tex. 1998) (citing Mayberry v. Vought Aircraft Co., 55 F.3d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1995)); see also
Fssex v- I.P.S., I11 F.3d 1304, E310 (7th Cir. !997)
258
[Vol. 35: 247, 2008] Welcome At Work?
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
discriminating employers include equitable relief, lost compensation,
liquidated damages, and attorneys' fees.1
6
In summary, USERRA attempted to clarify (1) employers' obligations
toward reservist employees, and (2) which individuals could assert rights
under its provisions. One significant issue not addressed by Congress,
which has yet to be fully addressed in the courts, is whether the "benefits of
employment" language of USERRA includes freedom from a hostile work
environment.77 If a supervisor inflicts abuse upon a reservist which does not
result in a discrete employment action such as termination, can the employer
be held equally responsible as it would be in harassment claims based on
race, gender, age, national origin, and disability? Courts should be willing
to recognize a hostile work environment claim under USERRA because
doing so would undermine a significant form of discrimination. To suggest
this position, it is necessary to examine the origins and purpose of the claim
for a hostile work environment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.78
III. TITLE VII AND THE CREATION OF THE HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT
CLAIM
Clearly Congress' actions over the last fifty years suggest a national
agenda to create a discrimination-free work environment; 79 an effort "to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment" between individuals,
whether it be based on gender, race, disability, or national origin. 80 Tangible
employment actions that are based on certain specified protected
classifications are expressly prohibited, but much discussion has evolved
over harassment claims. 8' Since 1971, beginning with Rogers v. EEOC,
82
the courts have recognized an implied discriminatory action of harassment
or hostile work environment based on a policy that employees should be free
from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and abuse in the workplace.83
The U.S. Supreme Court in Meritor, and then later in Harris, officially
76. 38 U.S.C. § 4323(d), (e), (h) (2004).
77. See infra Part 111.
78. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (2000).
79. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
80. Id. at 64; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) ("The phrase 'terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment .... (quoting Meritor, 477
U.S. at 64)).
81. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
82. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
83. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65.
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recognized the sexual harassment claim, stating that "when the workplace is
permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,' that is
'sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's
employment and create an abusive working environment, Title VII is
violated.'
8 4
Over the last thirty years, the hostile work environment claim has been
recognized under Title VII, Title IX, Americans with Disabilities Act
("ADA"), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). 85
However, only recently has a federal court officially recognized that the
hostile work environment claim might exist under USERRA or its
predecessor statutes.86  As the number of reservists being deployed
increases, we will likely see an increase in the number of USERRA hostile
work environment claims. This section will trace the development of the
hostile work environment claim prior to USERRA.
Harassment, or hostile work environment, was first recognized as a form
of discrimination protected under Title VII by the federal Fifth Circuit. The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rogers v. EEOC held that "the relationship
between an employee and his working environment is of such significance
as to be entitled to statutory protection.' 87 That case involved a Hispanic
employee who filed a complaint with the EEOC. 88 The claim stated that the
employer-doctor's practice of segregating patients based on national origin
constituted a discriminatory employment act in violation of Title VII.
89
Although the discriminatory act was not against the employee directly, the
indirect segregation of patients created a hostile workplace for the minority
employee. 90 In its analysis, the court justified the need to liberally interpret
unlawful employment practices under Section 703(a)(1) of Title V11 9'
because of the articulated purpose of the Act: to "eliminate the
inconvenience, unfairness, and humiliation of ethnic discrimination., 92 The
court opined:
84. Harris, 510 U.S. at2l.
85. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 237-38 (recognizing hostile environment claim under Title VII); Patricia
v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (recognizing hostile environment claim
under Title Xl); Fox v. GMC, 247 F.3d 169, 177 (4th Cir. 2001) (recognizing hostile environment
claim under the ADA); Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834-35 (6th Cir. 1996)
(recognizing hostile environment claim under the ADEA).
86. Vickers v. City of Memphis, 368 F. Supp. 2d 842, 844-45 (W.D. Tenn. 2005).
87. Rogers, 454 F.2d at 237-38.
88. Id. at 236.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 238-39. "An employer's patient discrimination may constitute a subtle scheme
designed to create a working environment imbued with discrimination and directed ultimately at
minority group employees." Id. at 239.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)(2000).
-, oges "... A 1,,4 -
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Employees' psychological, as well as economic, fringes are
statutorily entitled to protection from employer abuse, and ... the
phrase "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" in Section
703 is an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective
ambit the practice of creating a working environment heavily
charged with ethnic or racial discrimination. I do not wish to be
interpreted as holding that an employer's mere utterance of an
ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an
employee falls within the proscription of Section 703. But by the
same token I am simply not willing to hold that a discriminatory
atmosphere could under no set of circumstances ever constitute an
unlawful employment practice. One can readily envision working
environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy
completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers.
93
Rogers introduced the idea that disparate treatment in the workplace of a
protected group, be it based on race, sex, national origin or religion, can give
rise to claims under Title VII to individuals who fall within the targeted
group. 94  Title VII safeguards not only wages and schedules (standard
employment remuneration that should not involve certain characteristics in
its determination), but includes a more expansive view of employment
benefits or "intangible fringe benefits" that are valued by the modem
employee. 95 This case reflects formal equality principles in its desire to
eliminate unfairness and injustice by precluding employees from being
targets of discriminatory conduct even though the employees were not those
directly affected by the disparate treatment.
96
While the hostile environment claim was initially accepted by the courts
in racial discrimination cases, the subtleties of the theory were more fully
flushed out in the sexual harassment arena by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson. 97 In Meritor, an assistant bank
manager, Vinson, filed suit after being discharged for excessive use and
abuse of sick leave. 98 Vinson filed a complaint alleging that during the four
years she worked at the bank, her supervisor sexually harassed her in
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 240.
97. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
98. Id. at 60.
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violation of Title VII. 99 The conduct alleged was quite egregious, involving
fondling in front of other employees and in private, suggestive remarks,
demands for sexual favors during and after work hours, and repeated
instances of forcible rape.' 00 The Bank asserted that Title VII, in light of
previous Supreme Court cases, limited discrimination claims to those that
were of a tangible, economic nature.' 0 ' Borrowing from Rogers, the
Supreme Court rejected this view with its unequivocal assertion that, "[t]he
language of Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible'
discrimination. The phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment'
evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women' in employment."1
0 2
Following the decision in Meritor, questions quickly arose as to the
degree of severity or pervasiveness needed to rise to the level of actionable
harassment. The Supreme Court clarified this question in Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., stating that the egregious conduct that existed in Meritor was
not the minimum standard by which to judge severe-enough abuse. 10 3
Harris, a female manager, was employed at Forklift Systems, Inc., an
equipment rental company, for a period of two and a half years.' °4 During
her tenure, Harris found herself a target of repeated insults and sexual
innuendos from the president of the company.'o 5 The president ridiculed
Harris numerous times in front of other employees for being female,
including calling her a "dumb ass woman," telling the company the job
demanded a man not a woman, asking Harris to remove money from the
president's front pockets, and purposely throwing money on the floor and
then asking Harris to pick it up.106 Harris complained to the president but
the conduct did not stop.'0 7 Harris finally quit after the president jokingly
asked Harris, in the presence of others, whether she had promised to sleep
with a man with whom she was negotiating a deal.'08
The Supreme Court stated that actionable conduct need not be so severe
as to be expected to "seriously affect[] the plaintiffs psychological well-
being."' 0 9 Attempting to find the middle ground between merely offensive
conduct, which should not be actionable, and psychologically damaging
conduct, the Court opined:
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 64.
102. Id.
103. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
104. Id. at 19.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environment,
even one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological
well-being, can and often will detract from employees' job
performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or
keep them from advancing in their careers. 10
As the focus shifts from psychological well-being to performance, the
appropriate question becomes whether the environment is conducive for the
plaintiff to perform at the same level as another similarly situated
employee. "'
Further clarifying the "severe or pervasive" test, the Court held that the
environment must be (1) objectively hostile, meaning that the severity of the
harassment was to be judged from the perspective of a reasonable person in
the plaintiffs position, and (2) subjectively hostile, meaning that the
plaintiff must have found the conduct abusive and intolerable." 2 Provided
both of these exist, "there is no need for it also to be psychologically
injurious."' 3
The Court admonished that sexual harassment cases required the
examination of all the circumstances in order to determine whether an
environment is hostile or abusive.' '4  Factors to examine include the
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance." 5  The
effect on the employee's psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to
determining whether the plaintiff actually found the environment abusive.
But while psychological harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken
into account, no single factor is required. 116
As can be gleaned from the Title VII line of hostile environment cases,
particularly those relating to sexual harassment, four elements guide the
110. Id.
11. Id. ("[T]he very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created
a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin
offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality.").
112. Id. at 21-22 ("Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile
or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive-is beyond Title Vll's purview. Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the
environment to be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's
employment, and there is no Title VII violation.").
113. Id. at 22.
114. Id. at 23.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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courts in finding whether a hostile work environment exists: first, harassing
conduct must not be limited to isolated or merely offensive conduct but must
be extreme, severe, or pervasive to create a hostile or abusive working
environment; second, the employee must have reasonably perceived the
environment to be hostile or abusive; third, the employee must have been
harassed as a result of the protected characteristic; and fourth, the plaintiff
must show the employer was responsible for the harassment. 1" 7  An
employer may avoid such liability if it can show that (1) it took reasonable
efforts to create an environment free of harassment and corrected known
problems when they arose, and (2) the plaintiff employee unreasonably
failed to invoke the procedures established by the employer. 18
Though Title VII hostile work environment cases form the basis for
USERRA hostile work environment claims, the differences between
USERRA and Title VII should not be overlooked or minimized, as they are
critical in the hostile environment analysis. Unlike Title VII and the ADA,
which attempt to level the playing field for historically disadvantaged
individuals excluded from employment opportunities based on immutable
characteristics, USERRA provides antidiscrimination and accommodation
protections to individuals making a voluntary choice that ultimately impacts
job perfor1ance."9 These protections are extended not only based on a
theory of morality or equality, but also on a theory of national interest. 20
The author contends that USERRA claims should be evaluated according to
the effect the employer's treatment of the uniformed servicemember would
have on one's decision to enlist in the uniformed services.' 2' This will be
discussed in more detail below, but first we will look at the development of
the claim of hostile work environment under USERRA.
IV. COURT TREATMENT OF HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS RAISED
UNDER USERRA
The body of law regarding the availability of a hostile work
environment claim under USERRA is scant, but some courts have addressed
the issue.
In Petersen v. Department of the Interior, 122 Peterson, a disabled veteran
who served in the Army for more than five years and was honorably
discharged, was hired in 1993 by the National Park Service Ranger in a law
enforcement position. 23 Two years later, Peterson was stripped of his law
117. Id.
118. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
119. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 17-25 and accompanying text.
121. See infra Part V.-B.
122. 71 M.S.P.R. 227, 230 (M.S.P.B. 1996).
12.11 t 23U.
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enforcement assignment and assigned other duties. 124  In 1995, Peterson
filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor alleging, among other things,
that he was the victim of harassment at the Park Service because of his past
military service. 125  Specifically, Peterson claimed that "[d]uring the
application process and [from] the time of his hire, supervisors and co-
workers . . . made negative comments about [his] status as a disabled
veteran."'' 26 He complained that a supervisor indicated he was forced to hire
Peterson because Peterson was a disabled veteran.127 Peterson also claimed
he was harassed and belittled by coworkers, who called him such derogatory
names such as "psycho," "baby killer," and "plate head."' 128 He reported that
even though he complained to personnel, "no effective steps were taken to
end the hostile conduct."'
129
The case came before a reviewing panel of the Merit Systems Protection
Board. 130  The panel concluded that the purposes underlying the various
antidiscrimination statutes-including Title VII, Title IX, the Rehabilitation
Act, and the ADA-were similar in trying to eradicate particular forms of
employment discrimination.' 3' Relying upon Meritor, the Board held that
under the Congressional mandate requiring a broad interpretation, USERRA
was intended to preserve the "well-established principle that discrimination
encompasses hostile environment claims."' 132  The Board concluded that
harassment occurring because of service in the uniformed services is a
violation of USERRA. 13' Given the strong deference accorded the Board in
interpreting military law, the Petersen case appeared to resolve the question.
In a subsequent unpublished opinion in the case of Church v. City of
Reno, 134 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to follow Petersen.
135
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 235.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 230. On November 10, 1998, Congress amended USERRA to include a provision that
all federal employees have a right to have USERRA claims heard by the Merit Systems Protection
Board, "without regard as to whether the complaint occurred before, on or after October 13, 1994
[the date USERRA was enacted]." See 38 U.S.C. § 4324(c)(1) (2000).
131. Peterson, 71 M.S.P.R. at 239.
132. Id. at 237.
133. Id. at 239.
134. 1999 WL 65205 *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 1999).
135. Id. at * 1 n.3 (denying plaintiff's motion to show cause why the City of Reno and certain City
employees should not be held in contempt for violating a previous consent decree by subjecting
Church to a hostile work environment in violation of a previous consent decree enjoining the City
from violating USERRA or the specific language of the consent decree).
There, in 1987, the City of Reno had entered into a consent decree agreeing
not to "terminate, demote, punish, restrict or withhold accrual of benefits...
or otherwise discriminate against an employee as a result of his participation
in the Military Reserve or National Guard."' 136 Church complained that he
was subjected to a hostile work environment due to caustic anti-military
comments from coworkers. 137  The Ninth Circuit determined that any
"benefit of employment" under USERRA must accrue from "an employment
contract or agreement or an employer policy, plan, or practice;" 131 in other
words, from the consent decree. Therefore, Church could only claim
harassment under USERRA if the employer had somehow expressly
provided that it would not create, or allow to exist, a hostile work
environment. 139 Because Church was not able to show the consent decree
expressly forbade harassment for prior military service, or that his employer
promised a working environment "free from caustic comments by
coworkers," the court could not find that USERRA itself anticipated such a
benefit.140  The court rejected Church's claim that a consent decree's
"otherwise discriminate" language included a prohibition against creation of
a hostile work environment.' 4' The court simply refused to find, in its
words, that the "notoriously ambiguous" term "discrimination" included a
hostile work environment under USERRA. 142 Unfortunately, the court gave
no explanation for why it applied the anti-discrimination provisions of
USERRA differently from similar language in Title VII or other federal anti-
discrimination statutes.
Later, in the unreported case of Miller v. City of Indianapolis,143 Miller
and other firefighters filed a hostile work environment claim against the City
of Indianapolis, arguing that supervisors in the fire department pressured
them to "get out of the Guard" and that one firefighter was told that
participation in the Guard "threw up a red flag" any time he was "marked off
sick."' 44 Evidently, a supervisor also told Miller it was department policy to
pressure employees to resign from the Guard. 145 The District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana held that there existed no affirmative right to
136. Id. at *2.
137. Seeid. at*l.
138. The Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C.
§ 4303(2) (2000).
139. See Church, 1999 WL 65205, at *1.
140. Id. In addition, the court refused to recognize such a benefit because neither the U.S.
Supreme Court nor the Ninth Circuit had interpreted USERRA or the VRRA as creating liability for
a hostile work environment. Id.
141. See id. at *2.
142. See id.
143. No. IP-99-1735-CMS, 2001 WL 406346 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 13, 2001), affd 281 F.3d 648 (7th
Cir. 2002).
144. Id. at *2.
145 . Md.
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employment in the Reserves146 and that, even if a hostile work environment
claim did exist under USERRA, the plaintiffs had failed to show pressure to
resign from the Reserves created a hostile work environment "sufficiently
severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of ... employment and create
an abusive working environment." 147
In 2002, the case was heard by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit. 148 There, without expressly holding that a hostile work
environment harassment claim was available under USERRA, the court
simply affirmed the lower court's conclusion that no substantial evidence
supported a harassment claim. 149 So the ultimate question remained open.
A puzzling case partially recognizing a USERRA hostile work
environment claim was Vickers v. City of Memphis,150 where the court held
that hostile work environment and harassment claims are viable under
USERRA, but only if the plaintiff can establish that such harassment is a
violation of the employment policy.151 Vickers relied upon an earlier Sixth
Circuit opinion later addressed by the Supreme Court, Monroe v. Standard
Oil. The court held that USERRA's precursor, VRRA, was:
Intentionally framed in general terms to encompass the potentially
limitless variation in benefits of employment that are conferred by
an untold number and variety of business concerns .... [W]e read
section 2021 (b)(3) to protect only those employment benefits that a
reservist can establish exist at his place of employment. In
establishing their existence, incidents or advantages of employment
must be ascertained by reference to employment rules or employer
practices at the employer's business establishment.' 52
The Vickers court then accepted a hostile work environment claim by
slightly modifying the Meritor "severe or pervasive" test. 153  The court
required the conduct to be "'sufficiently pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive working environment,' and that Plaintiff
is entitled to such a benefit of employment by virtue of an employer
policy.' ' 154 The Vickers court appeared to follow the reasoning of Church v.
146. Id. at *7.
147. Id. at *8 (quoting Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
148. Miller v. City of Indianapolis, 281 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2002).
149. See id. at 653-54.
150. 368 F. Supp. 2d 842 (W.D. Tenn. 2005).
151. ld. at 845.
152. Id. at 844-45 (citing Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 613 F.2d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1980)).
153. Id.
154. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
City of Reno, 155 which stated that unless there was some employer document
or policy that prevented harassment, no such claim was available under
USERRA. 15 6 The court failed to explain why a harassment claim for hostile
work environment would only exist under USERRA if the employer
established that principle as a policy.
On the heels of Vickers, the United States District Court for the District
of Puerto Rico in the case of Reyes v. Hosptial San Pable Del Este'57
recognized that "[t]he law is unsettled as to whether hostile work
environment claims are cognizable under USERRA."' 58 The court did not
specifically hold that a hostile work environment claim was cognizable
under the "benefits of employment" language of USERRA, 59 but rather, the
court assumed, arguendo, that such a claim was tenable, applied traditional
hostile working environment analysis, and found the plaintiffs case
insufficient. 6 In sum, the court concluded the plaintiff had failed to show
that a single harassment episode, negative work reviews, and a threat to
notify management of frequent absences created an "objectively" hostile
work environment. 16'
Finally, in January 2006, in Maher v. City of Chicago,162 the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois refused to grant the
City of Chicago's summary judgment motion on Jerome Maher's claim that
he had been harassed as a result of his service in the Gulf War. 163 The court
relied upon Petersen v. Dept. of Interior and held that "[h]arassment on
account of prior military service can be a violation of USERRA."' 64 The
court, quoting Miller, held that to be actionable, a claim for harassment
under USERRA "must be supported by evidence that the employer's
conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment and create an abusive work environment."' 165  The court
reasoned that, while Maher's claims of harassment were weak, that did not
mean "the conduct about which he complain[ed was] not part of the ongoing
alleged pattern of harassment, the actionability of which must be determined
by a contextual, not an atomistic, analysis. 1
66
155. Id. at 844 n.4.
156. No. 97-17097, 1999 WL 65205, at *1 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 1999).
157. 389 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.P.R. 2005).
158. Id. at 212.
159, Id.
160. Id. at212-13.
161. Id. at 213.
162. 406 F. Supp. 2d 1006 (N.D. II1. 2006).
163. Id. at 1023.
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Miller v. City of Indianapolis, 281 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2002)).
166. Id.; see also Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 615 (1st Cir. 1996).
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The foregoing illustrates that while courts appear to be moving toward
adopting a hostile work environment claim under USERRA, the law remains
"unsettled." This article stands for the proposition that the time has come
for federal courts to unequivocally recognize a hostile work environment
claim under USERRA. Support for that proposition is found below.
V. CLAIMS FOR EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BASED UPON THE
CREATION OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT DIRECTED AT A PERSON
BECAUSE OF SERVICEMEMBER STATUS SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED UNDER
USERRA
Courts and Congress, by amendment to USERRA if necessary, should
unequivocally recognize the viability of hostile work environment
discrimination claim under USERRA. This conclusion is mandated because
it is consistent with the language of the statute itself, the legislative history
of the statute, the principles of Title VII and other federal antidiscrimination
statutes and the interests of national security.
A. A Hostile Work Environment Claim Under USERRA Should Be
Recognized Because It Is Consistent with the Text of the Statute.
USERRA's express language supports a claim for a hostile work
environment. USERRA states that a uniformed servicemember "shall not be
denied . . .any benefit of employment ... ,,67 It is patent that the term
"benefit of employment" encompasses freedom from a hostile work
environment. To conclude otherwise yields an illogical result.
. Even the most ardent textualist interpreters, including Justice Scalia,
agree that a statute's text must be interpreted to avoid absurd results. 168
Arguing that freedom from abuse is a benefit that does not "accrue[] by
reason of an employment contract or agreement or an employer policy, plan,
or practice" as the Vickers v. City of Memphis 16 9 court did, is nonsensical. 170
There, the court concluded that if an employer does not explicitly indicate in
writing that its company policy is to not abuse its employees, an abused
employee has no redress. 17 ' Did Congress intend the rights afforded to
167. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a).
168. See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecking Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 449 n.4
(2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A possibility so startling (and unlikely to occur) is well enough
precluded by the rule that a statute should not be interpreted to produce absurd results.").
169. 368 F. Supp. 2d 842, 844 (W.D. Tenn. 2005).
170. See 38 U.S.C. § 4303(2).
171. Vickers, 368 F. Supp. 2d at 844-45.
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servicemembers to be determined by employer policy? The Vickers court
appeared to follow the reasoning of the unpublished decision in Reno,'72
which relied upon the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe. 173 However,
any reliance on Monroe to define the rights of servicemembers under
USERRA is misplaced. Monroe explained the provisions of the VRRA-
not USERRA. 174 The VRRA was found inadequate, which is why USERRA
was passed. 75 Moreover, if an employer has a policy against harassment, a
plaintiff could seek relief on the basis of that policy alone, without regard to
whether or not USERRA, or any other anti-discrimination law for that
matter, applied. Therefore, any interpretation of USERRA to provide only a
qualified claim of hostile work discrimination is misguided.
B. A Hostile Work Environment Claim Under USERRA Should Be
Recognized Because It Is Consistent with Legislative Intent.
Simply because some interpretation flows from the text of a statute does
not necessarily mean it is law. "It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not
within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."' 176 This axiom, while
generally true, has no application to USERRA, as the framers of the statute
were explicit that USERRA is to be interpreted broadly for the benefit of
servicemembers. 1
77
Whether to promote fairness to uniformed servicemembers, "to
encourage noncareer service in the uniformed services,""178 or to further the
interests of national security, Congress clearly wanted this statute interpreted
favorably to the interests of uniformed servicemembers.1 79 Directing that
the statute be "broadly construed and strictly enforced,"' 8 ° the provisions
were meant to be "broadly defined to include all attributes of the
employment relationship which are affected by the absence of a member of
the uniformed services because of military service. '  In fact, so important
is the mandate to construe USERRA broadly, one court has held it is one of
the two fundamental principles underlying the act, rivaled only by
172. Id. at 844 n.4.
173. Id. at 844.
174. See Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 613 F.2d 641,641 (6th Cir. 1980).
175, H R. REP. NO. 103-65 (1993).
176. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
177. H.R. REP. No. 103-65 (1993).
178. The Uniformed Services Employment and Re-Employment Rights Act of 1994, 38 U.S.C.
§ 4301 (2004).
179. H.R. REP. No. 103-65 (1993).
180. Id. at 23.
181. Petersen v. Dept. of Interior, 71 M.S.P.R. 227 (1996) (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-65, Pt. 1, at
21 (1993)).
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USERRA's principal purpose, the reemployment of uniformed
servicemembers. 1
82
Equally favorable to a recognition of the hostile work environment
claim is Congress's intention regarding the definition of"benefit." Congress
effectively neutralized the use of the canon expressio unius est exclusio
alterius 83 when it stated, "[t]he list of benefits is illustrative and not
intended to be all inclusive."' 84  Congress expressly freed courts to use
independent judgment and to not be constrained by USERRA's text when
interpreting the word benefit so as to give the greatest protection possible to
servicemembers. Patently, a USERRA claim for hostile work environment
discrimination is both "within [the] spirit, [and] within the intention of its
makers."185
C. A Hostile Work Environment Claim Under USERRA Should Be
Recognized Because It Is Consistent with the Text of Title VII and Other
Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes.
1. Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act Supports a Hostile Work
Environment Claim.
The 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title VII states "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer . . . [to] discriminate against any
182. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock, 328 U.S. 275 (1946). In areas outside of hostile work
environment claims, courts have been willing to honor the congressional mandate to construe
USERRA broadly in favor of uniformed servicemembers. With respect to reemployment rights,
courts have strengthened veterans' protections by construing the "cause" needed to fire a
reemployed servicemember very narrowly in favor of the servicemember. Duarte v. Agilent
Technologies, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1046-47 (D. Col. 2005). The court in Duarte held that
firing a reservist reemployed as a design consultant during his protected period was a violation of
USERRA even though the employer was faced with severe difficulties. Id. at 1048. Typically, after
reemployment, uniformed servicemembers are guaranteed a continuation of their employment for a
period of six months to one year unless the employer can show cause for not continuing
reemployment during the protected period. 38 U.S.C. § 4316(c). Though Agilent lost $1.5 billion
dollars the year before firing Duarte and no clients wanted Duarte working on their projects, the
court held there was insufficient cause for termination. Duarte, 366 F. Supp. 2d at 1048. The court
construed the statute in favor of the uniformed servicemember, interpreting the word "cause"
narrowly to exclude the employer's difficult circumstances. Id. at 1048.
183. "[Elxpressio unius est exclusio alterius" is a maxim of statutory interpretation meaning that
the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. Metzger v. DaRosa, 805 N.E.2d 1165, 1172
(111. 2004). When a statute lists a certain number of examples, it is understood that all examples not
included are excluded. Id. The legislative history is significant because it tells that expressio unius
does not apply to the definition of "benefit." See, e.g., id.
184. Petersen, 71 M.S.P.R. at 236 (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-65, pt. 1, at 21 (1993)).
185. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892).
individual with respect to ...privileges of employment[.]"' 6  USERRA
provides that no servicemember shall be denied the "benefit of
employment."' 18 7  There is no meaningful distinction between USERRA's
"benefit of employment" language and Title VII's "privilege[] of
employment." USERRA's term "benefit" includes all Title VII "privileges,"
including freedom from a hostile work environment, and more. 18' Black's
Law Dictionary tells that benefit is necessarily a broader term than privilege
by including the term privilege in the definition of benefit. 189 It says that a
benefit is any "[a]dvantage, privilege ... [p]rofit or gain."' 90 From this it is
clear that the universe of benefits includes all privileges. Webster's
Dictionary agrees when it defines privilege as "a right or immunity granted
as a peculiar benefit, advantage, or favor,"' 9' thus defining privilege as a
"peculiar" type of benefit or advantage. In sum, benefits include all
privileges and more, such that the employee privilege to be free from a
hostile work environment is also a benefit of employment. The recognition
of a USERRA claim for a hostile work environment is a corollary to a Title
VII recognition of that claim.
The Supreme Court has stated that "Title VII affords employees the
right to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation ...
192 Its expansive concept is to remove destructive measures that inhibit the
"'emotional and psychological stability of minority group workers."" 93 The
Court is attempting to sustain equitable treatment for all. As minorities in
the workplace, uniformed servicemembers are in as much need of emotional
and psychological stability as any other class of workers or persons. In fact,
considering the mental and emotional trauma associated with military
service, their need may be greater when compared to other protected
classes. 194  To deny uniformed servicemembers recourse in the face of a
186. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2002).
187. 38 U.S.C. §4311(a)(2002).
188. See id. While people are generally deemed to hold privileges because of their positions, such
as an attorney possessing an attorney-client privilege, benefits encompass any employee advantage.
Having a boss that occasionally allows her employees to go home early on Fridays may be a benefit,
but is not a privilege. Health insurance plans and a high salary are also benefits of employment,
but not necessarily privileges. The presidential privilege of confidentiality, which allows the
President to maintain records free from public scrutiny, is a privilege. This is a privilege because it
is necessarily connected to the office of the President. But it is also a benefit because it is an
advantage to the President: it frees the President from having to reveal personal papers to the public.
Other privileges include husband-wife, physician-patient, and employer-employee, each of which
attaches to a particular class of persons.
189. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 166 (8th Ed. 2004).
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. Definition of Privilege-Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://m-w.com/dictionary/
privilege (last visited Oct. 18, 2007) (italics added).
192. Meritor Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
193. Id. (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
194. See Deborah White, Iraq War Results & Statistics as of Sept. 23, 2007, ABOUT.COM,
http://usliberals.about.com/od/homelandsecuritl/a/IraqNumbers.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2006)
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hostile work environment would be to unjustifiably single them out among
minorities.
Also, because servicemembers put their lives and their families' well-
being in jeopardy for society's benefit, the principles underlying Title VII
society should watch over them and protect their interests. Anti-
discrimination statutes are often justified on the basis of remedying past
wrongs, on the grounds that because society has wronged those particular
groups in the past, it is just that society now aid and look after their
interests.' 95 This type of "societal debt" reasoning is equally applicable to
uniformed servicemembers. Instead of remedying a past wrong, society is
repaying a present service. Because uniformed servicemembers are
providing society with a crucial service, society should protect them from
the hostile working environments to which they are subject because of their
service. It is only fair to protect those who, in such an important capacity,
protect us.
2. The ADA Recognizes a Hostile Work Environment Claim.
The ADA prohibits discrimination in the "[t]erms, conditions or
privileges of employment."' 196 This language is identical to that embodied in
Title VII. 197 The 1995 case of Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc. 198 held that it
would be "illogical to hold that ADA language identical to that of Title VII
was intended to afford disabled individuals less protection ... than remedies
and procedures of Title VII . . . ."'99 The Court went on to affirmatively
hold that a hostile work environment claim for harassment is available under
the ADA.200 A series of subsequent cases have affirmed that principle.20 '
The same reasoning should hold for USERRA claims.
("30% of US troops develop serious mental health problems within 3 to 4 months of returning
home.").
195. Fay, supra note 30, at 302 n.3 (citing CIVIL RIGHTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY xi (Kermit Hall
ed. 1987)).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2001).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2003).
198. 893 F. Supp. 1092 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
199. Id. at It06.
200. Id. at 1106-07.
201. See Fritz v. Mascotech Auto. Sys. Group, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1481, 1494 (E.D. Mich. 1996);
Mannell v. Am. Tobacco Co., 871 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Va. 1994); see also Hendler v. Intelecom
USA, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Hogue v. MQS Inspection, Inc., 875 F. Supp.
714 (D. Co. 1995).
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3. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 Recognizes a
Hostile Work Environment Claim.
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 provides in relevant part
that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance . . . Several cases have applied the Title VII
principles and remedies to Title IX cases. In the case of Brown v. Hot, Sexy
and Safer Productions, Inc. 20 3 the reviewing federal appellate court
concluded that "[b]ecause the relevant caselaw under Title IX [was]
relatively sparse, we apply Title VII caselaw by analogy. ' ' 204 The court,
quoting Meritor, concluded that Title VII, and hence Title IX by analogy,
"strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women,
including conduct having the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive environment. '"20 5 The same meaning of Title VII should apply by
analogy to USERRA claims.
4. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Provides for a Hostile Work
Environment Claim.
Title VII theories have long been applied when claims under section 794
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973206 are at issue. 20 7 That section, mirroring
the language of Title IX, provides that
no otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by
reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 208
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pendleton v. Jefferson Local School
District Board of Education held that a hostile work environment claim
under the Rehabilitation Act is cognizable under the language of section
7 209 Specifically, the court held that to determine otherwise "would have
202. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2000).
203. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995).
204. Id. at 540.
205. Id.
206. 29 U.S.C. § 794.
207. See Jasany v. U.S. Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985); Doe v. N.Y. Univ., 666 F.2d
761 (2d Cir. 1981); Prewitt v. U.S. Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
208. § 794(a).
209. No. 91-3126, 1992 WL 57421, at *9 (6th Cir. Mar. 25, 1992).
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the restrictive result of making an employer whofires an employee because
of a handicap liable, while leaving untouched an employer who harasses or
otherwise engages in discriminatory conduct against a handicapped
individual, which, as a direct result, causes further deterioration of a
person's physical condition.... ""o
Based upon the broad interpretation Congress intended to be given to
anti-discrimination statutes, and the concomitant response of federal courts
in applying the principles and remedies of Title VII's hostile work
environment claims, other anti-discrimination acts, including USERRA,
should be treated the same.
D. Recognizing a Hostile Work Environment Claim Furthers the Interests
of National Security.
Perhaps dwarfing in importance the interests of fairness and equity are
USERRA's roots in national security. Congress has given sweeping and
sometimes startling amounts of power to the President in the interest of
ensuring national security. For example, Congress enacted the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which, in the interest of
national security, authorizes the President to undertake a broad array of
economic sanctions, including the seizure of property against foreign
persons, organizations, or nations if the President finds that there exists an
"unusual and extraordinary threat . . . to the national security., 21'
Additionally, Congress recognized the President's "authority under the
Constitution to take action to deter and prevent acts of international
terrorism against the United States," and authorized him "to use all
necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided" the
September 11 attacks.212 Thus we see that even the honored safeguard of
checks and balances can sometimes be dwarfed by the interests of national
security.
In view of congressional willingness to ensure sound national security, it
is no surprise that Congress intended that courts interpret USERRA broadly
in favor of uniformed servicemembers. 213 Even among policies as important
210. Id. at *12 (emphasis added). Other cases have reached the same conclusion. See Spells v.
Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 889 F. Supp. 1023, 1028 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Rothman v. Emory Univ., 828 F.
Supp. 537, 542 (N.D. I11. 1993).
211. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a). The President must also declare a national emergency with respect
to the threat. § 1701(b).
212. Authorization for Use of Military Force, PUB. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
213. H.R. REP. NO. 103-65 at 23 (1993).
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as creating equality in workplaces and removing racial, gender, and ethnic
discrimination, national security is paramount. The creation of a prejudice-
free, poverty-free, educated, and serviceable America requires a nation
whose autonomy and longevity are secure. All intranational considerations
stand upon the foundation of national security.
And USERRA, with its goal of promoting enlistment in the uniformed
services, is an important part of this foundation.2 14 Reservists are becoming
an increasingly central part of defending our nation. As noted above, "[t]he
use of noncareer military personnel for active duty assignments has become
more prevalent as the United States has both reduced the number of full-time
soldiers and increased its military involvement throughout the world. ' 2 5
Over 530,000 civilian soldiers have been mobilized since September 11,
2001 and forty percent of American forces in Iraq are reserve troops, a
number that is expected to rise.2 16 The importance of creating a climate that
encourages service in the Reserves is greater today than ever.
More than 390,000 civilian soldiers have demobilized during this "War
on Terror," most returning to the United States with hopes of continuing
their former employment.21 7 USERRA unquestionably protects uniformed
servicemembers with reemployment rights and protection against adverse
employment actions based on uniformed service, but without recourse
against hostile work environments, there remains a gap in the adequacy of
the protection. When deciding whether to enlist, uniformed servicemembers
must believe a decision to enlist will neither jeopardize their employment,
214. Representative Evans illustrated USERRA's root in national security as well as the need for
adequate enforcement. 144 CONG. REC. H1396-98 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Evans). Here, he speaks of the need to cover state employers in the statute, but the reasoning can be
equally persuasive when dealing with recognizing claims for a hostile work environment:
Federal law must assure that the appropriate remedies are available when violations
of [USERRA] threaten our Nation's ability to attain and maintain a strong military
force . . . . By passing [the amendment ensuring protection for state employees] we
are .. .fulfilling our Constitutional duty to "provide for the common Defence" of our
nation. With the need to utilize the resources of the National Guard and Reserves to meet
our Total Force military responsibilities, it is essential that those who volunteer to serve
our country be protected by adequate safeguards of their right to obtain and retain
suitable civilian employment. The United States has a strong national interest in assuring
that its military readiness will not be undermined by policies and practices which can
deter competent and qualified citizens from military service . . . . The ability of the
United States to attract and retain the competent and qualified personnel necessary to
meet our national security interests will be undermined absent a remedy [against state
employers] ....
Id.
215. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Can Congress Use Its War Powers to Protect Military Employees from
State Sovereign Immunity?, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 999, 999 (2004).
216. News Release, National Conference of State Legislatures, Labor Department Issues First-
Ever Regulations Protecting the Reemployment Rights of America's Soldiers (Dec. 16, 2005),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/employ/USERRA.htm [hereinafter Labor Department Regulations];
Quinn, supra note 5, at 237 (citing Bradley Graham, Reservists May Face Longer Tours of Duty,
WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2005, at Al).
21 7. Lao Deartmen.to Regulations, supra note 2 16
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nor subject them to a discriminatorily abusive working environment. If
effectuated, this strengthening of USERRA will encourage enlistment in the
Reserves and boost troop morale. Conversely, if those returning Reservists
who are subjected to a hostile work environment have no legal protection, an
awareness of the lack of interest in the plight of the returning uniformed
servicemember will spread, enlistment will be deterred, morale will be
damaged, and national security will be compromised.
VI. CONCLUSION
The increase in the use of part-time military to support the "War on
Terror" has placed an extraordinary burden upon employers, who are
required to comply with the reemployment provisions of USERRA. There is
no question this compliance can be burdensome.28 Given that an
unprecedented number of Reservists and Guard members will be leaving and
returning to work, it is inevitable that tension in the workplace will result as
employers and other workers must accommodate this disruption. Because of
this, servicemembers are likely to face increased hostility at work from
frustrated co-workers and managers. Without a recognized claim under
USERRA, servicemembers may suffer hostile work environment
discrimination in employment.
Currently the law does not provide for a claim to remedy these
conditions.21 9 This is wrong. The statute provides that all benefits of
employment should accrue to servicemembers. The intent of Congress was
that USERRA's protections be interpreted broadly. Other anti-
discrimination statutes are in accord with that principle, and recognizing it in
the context of USERRA is central to national security. Recognizing a
USERRA claim for hostile work environment is at once necessary, natural,
and wise.
218. Id.
219. See supra Part IV.
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